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ALDINGER v. HOWARD:
AT THE CROSSROADS OF PENDENT PARTY
JURISDICTION AND SECTION 1983
LIMITS ON SUABLE "PERSONS"
Rampant growth of the federal caseload has generated a new
awareness of jurisdictional limitations found in article III of the
Constitution.' Theoretically, the federal courts, being courts of
limited jurisdiction, may only hear claims over which Congress,
2
pursuant to article III, has conferred subject matter jurisdiction-.
However, the well established doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction provide that the federal courts may, in certain
circumstances, entertain nonfederal claims not otherwise within
their statutory jurisdiction. These judicially created doctrines
have expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction upon the premise
that article III confers jurisdiction over "cases" and not "questions," "claims," or "causes of action" and that the actual parameters of these "cases" are undefined.
Pendent jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to join both federal
and nonfederal claims against the same defendant in his original
complaint. 4 Ancillary jurisdiction, a broader concept, allows
joinder of nonfederal claims filed by original parties subsequent
to the original complaint, as in the case of compulsory counterclaims, and by or against additional parties whose presence would
otherwise deprive the court of its jurisdiction.!- The two doc1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in relevant part:

"The judicial

Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . with such Exceptions, and

under such Regulations as Congress shall make." (emphasis added).
2. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How. 440) 453 (1850).
3. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976).
4. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is securely rooted in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974);
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Congress has given at least partial approval to the doctrine by the
enactment of: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970) (providing for the extension of federal patent jurisdiction to joined state claims of unfair competition when related to a substantial claim under the copyright, patent,
plant variety protection or trademark laws); and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(c) (1970) (providing for the extension of federal removal jurisdiction
to a state claim joined with a removable federal claim).
See generally 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

18.07 [1.-1] to

[1-5]

(1974); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 19, at
72-77 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Shakman, The New
Pendant Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968);
Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962).
5. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 9, at 21; Fortune, Pendent Jurisdic-
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trines are further distinguished in that each sprung from a

historically distinct line of precedent and was justified by a dif6
ferent underlying rationale.
Numerous lower court decisions have upheld the extension
of pendent claim jurisdiction to nonfederal claims involving additional parties under the designation of pendent party jurisdiction.7 In general, justification for pendent party jurisdiction
has been based upon a broad reading of United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs." Gibbs upheld the power of a district court to grant
relief on a plaintiff's state claims against the same defendant
tion-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 12-13
n.34 (1972).
In WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 9, at 23, the incorporation of ancillary
jurisdiction into the Federal Rules is discussed:
Ancillary jurisdiction permits courts to hear compulsory counterclaims, under Rule 13(a), and to bring in additional parties to respond to a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(h) ....

Cross

claims, under Rule 13(g), are ancillary. Impleader of a third party
defendant under Rule 14 falls within ancillary jurisdiction. . . . Ancillary jurisdiction is available in interpleader, under Rule 22. Intervention as of right, under Rule 24 (a), comes within the Court's ancillary jurisdiction....

See

generally 13

WRIGHT,

MILLER

&

COOPER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND

Jurisdiction § 3523 (1969); Baker, Toward a Relaxed View
of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 759
(1972).
6. See notes 41-54 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975)
(federal question jurisdiction extended to a related state tort claim involving additional defendants); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States,
519 F.2d 1184, 1193-96 (5th Cir. 1975) (federal question jurisdiction extended to state tort claim against individual defendants joined with a
federal tort claim against the United States); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d
516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (federal question jurisdiction over civil rights claims against prison officials extended to state
tort claim against prisoner); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864,
866-67 (8th Cir. 1973) (patent jurisdiction extended to state unfair competition claims against defendants against whom patent claims had been
dismissed); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971)
(federal question jurisdiction over civil rights claims extended to joined
federal claim not meeting the $10,000 jurisdictional amount asserted
against additional defendant); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1971) (admiralty jurisdiction over claim
against shipper extended to state contract claim against shipper's trucking agent). Contra, Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1972)
PROCEDURE:

(refusing to extend federal jurisdiction over civil rights claim against in-

dividuals to state tort claim against county); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d
136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969) (dismissing a plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium which was under the $10,000 jurisdictional amount when joined
in spouse's diversity action for damages in excess of $10,000).
8. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Gibbs involved an action brought in federal
district court for compensatory and punitive damages based on alleged
violations of a section of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970). Joined with the federal claim was a state claim
for conspiracy to interfere with contract relations. In Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713 (1973), the Court said: "numerous decisions throughout the courts of appeals since Gibbs have recognized the
existence of judicial power to hear pendent claims involving pendent
parties where 'the entire action before the court comprises but one con-

stitutional "case" as defined in Gibbs.'"

(footnote omitted).
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when both state and federal claims arise from a "common nucleus
of operative fact" and can therefore be viewed as a single constitutional "case."9 Under Gibbs, the power to exercise pendent
claim jurisdiction is discretionary and is based upon considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties,"' which may apply equally to pendent party jurisdiction. In
the Gibbs opinion, the Court referred to the liberal policy of
joinder of both claims and parties underlying the Federal Rules
As a result, although factually Gibbs dealt
of Civil Procedure.'
only with joinder of claims, more than one court has concluded
that there is no principled difference between joinder of claims
12
and joinder of parties.
The advantages afforded by pendent party jurisdiction are
especially evident within the context of civil rights actions. Actions brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
14
1871 13 have added greatly to the burden of the federal caseload
9. The Gibbs Court found that:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim 'arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority . . . ,' U.S. Const., Art. III. § 2, and the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that

the
action before the court comprises but one constitutional
'case.'entire
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court . .

.

. The state and federal

claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a
plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality
of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole.
383 U.S. at 725-26 (footnotes and citations omitted).
10. 383 U.S. at 726.
11. "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest
possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." 383 U.S. at 724.
12. See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1971)
("The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is sufficiently broad to support
a claim within the limits of Gibbs against a person not a party to the
primary, jurisdiction-granting claim."); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971) ("The constitutional rationale which underlies the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule 13 (a) and Rule 14 may be applied to support the conclusion
that a federal court has the power to hear a related state claim against

"); Astor-Honor, Inc.
a defendant not named in the federal claim . . ...

v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Although
the pendent claim in Gibbs did not include a party not named in the
federal claim, Mr. Justice Brennan's language and the common sense
considerations underlying it seem broad enough to cover that problem
also.").
13. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
14. Complaints filed under section 1983 after the post-war period

234 The John Marshall Journal of. Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:231

in spite of the fact that judicial interpretation has excluded municipal corporations and other public corporations from the class
of suable defendants under the Act.", Because section 1983
actions may not be brought against public corporations, such as
counties and municipalities, plaintiffs have been unable to join
both individual and corporate defendants in one federal action. 16
Litigants seeking to sue both individual and corporate defendants
have been forced to either bring their actions in state court, or
to shoulder the burden of dual litigation by suing individual defendants in federal court and corporate defendants in state court.
However, if valid, pendent party jurisdiction would allow a
plaintiff to sue individual defendants under section 1983 and to
join his factually related state claims against corporate defendants in the same federal action.
Pendent party jurisdiction clashed with congressional limits
on section 1983 suable defendants in Aldinger v. Howard.1" In
Aldinger the Supreme Court was presented with the general
issue of whether pendent party jurisdiction is a valid extension
of a district court's article III power. The Aldinger majority concluded that pendent party jurisdiction was not available to
circumvent the restrictions on section 1983 suable "persons,"
were infinitesimal until Monroe v. Pape was decided in 1960 [sic,
1961]. Then the deluge began. In fiscal 1960 there were 280 cases
brought under section 1983; in fiscal 1970, 3,586. Thus, between 1960
and 1970 there has been a rise of 1,100 percent compared to a rise in
the same decade of 45 percent in civil cases generally. There was
another significant. increase in fiscal 1971, when 4,609 section 1983
cases were brought, 1,023 more than the previous year.
Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 Law
AND THE SOc. ORD. 557, 563 (1973).
See generally P. BATER, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART'& WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION, 75-107 (1973); Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1051 (1972).
15. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
For discussion of these cases see notes 25-31 and accompanying text
infra. But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
(§ 1983 action against a private corporation dismissed on other grounds).

16. A typical situation is where the acts of a'corporate official or agent
violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights. For example, when city police
officers illegally break and enter into a plaintiff's home, the plaintiff may
want to sue both the individual police officers and the city which employs
them. Suing a corporation for the acts of its agents may be desirable
for several reasons: (1) individual defendants may be judgment proof,
thus making it necessary to reach the "deep pocket" of the corporation;
(2) holding corporations responsible for the acts of their agents may
deter unconstitutional conduct; and (3) placing the responsibility on a
particular individual may be impossible. See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 770,
782 (1975); Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 136-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kates and Kouba].
17. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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however, the majority declined to decide the broader issue of
whether pendent party jurisdiction may exist in other factual
situations. Relying upon an examination of the relationships of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction to article III, the majority
offered several vague guidelines for determining the outermost
reaches of federal jurisdiction. Yet, although the majority ostensibly rested its decision on both article III and statutory
grounds, an analysis of Aldinger reveals that the majority's
decision can, perhaps, best be explained as a continuation of the
Burger Court's policy of limiting the scope of federal jurisdiction. 18
FACTS AND DISTRICT COURT RULING

In 1971, Aldinger filed her complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington seeking
damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief stemming from
her alleged wrongful dismissal from a clerical position in the
Spokane County Treasurer's office. Aldinger claimed that two
months after she was hired she received a letter from Howard,
the Spokane County Treasurer, informing her that, although her
job performance had been excellent, her employment would be
terminated because she allegedly was living with her boyfriend.
Howard's action was predicated upon a state statute authorizing
the revocation of appointments "at pleasure" of the appointing
officer.19
Aldinger brought her civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 198820 against Howard, his wife, the county commissioners, and Spokane County, a public corporation. Jurisdiction over
the federal claims against the individual defendants was premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343.21 State claims against the county
18. See text accompanying notes 96-100 infra.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.16.070 (1973).

20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides that:

The jurisdiction in civil criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights,
and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions neces-

sary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.

21. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in relevant part that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
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were asserted pursuant to a state statute abolishing immunity
of public corporations and providing for vicarious liability for
the tortious conduct of their officials. 22 The district court dismissed all claims against the county for lack of subject matter
2
jurisdiction.. 3
THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

(1) that her complaint
On appeal, Aldinger contended:
stated valid federal claims against the county under sections
1983 and 1988, and thus fell within the district court's section
1343(3) jurisdiction; and (2) that the dismissal of her federal
claims against the county did not preclude the district court from
exercising pendent jurisdiction over her state claims. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as to all claims
against the county holding that both of Aldinger's contentions
24
were foreclosed by precedent.
As to Aldinger's first contention, that a public corporation is
suable under sections 1983 and 1988 in a state where governmental tort immunity has been abolished, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule of Moor v. County of Alameda.25 Moor in turn
had followed Monroe v. Pape.26 Monroe, a civil rights action
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of United States ....
Id. (emphasis added).
Aldinger also included 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the jurisdiction implementing statute for article III federal question cases, in her jurisdictional
statement. Since § 1343 provides original jurisdiction over a § 1983 cause
of action regardless of the amount in controversy, the inclusion of the
§ 1331 jurisdictional allegation in petitioner's complaint appears unnecessary. However, the Supreme Court has sustained an action directly
under the fourth amendment for damages meeting the § 1331 jurisdictional amount. See note 100 infra. Petitioner did not argue the point,
though, and neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court reached
the question. 427 U.S. at 4 n.3.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.120 (1973).
23. The district court's order of dismissal is not reported.
24. Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (1975).
25. 411 U.S. 693 (1973), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972).
The Monroe Court faced two important
26. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
policy considerations: (1) the probability of a flood of federal litigation
if the "under color of State law" clause of section 1983 were extended
to actions by officials which exceeded their legal authority; and (2) the
anamoly of denying a plaintiff access to a federal forum in a civil rights
action merely because the official actions complained of were equally
offensive to state law. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the majority of six in what appears to have been a compromise decision. See Note,
Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L.
REv. 1201, 1207-08 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developing]. Compare

Aldinger v. Howard

19771

for damages which was brought against the city of Chicago and
thirteen Chicago policemen, held that, based upon a reading of
the legislative history of section 1983,'2 suable defendants under
28
the act did not include municipal corporations.
In Moor, which was also a civil rights action for damages,
the plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the holding in Monroe by
arguing that under section 1988 state law claims could be asserted
against the county of Alameda. The Court in Moor held that
section 1988 was limited to incorporation of state remedies and
did not incorporate state causes of action into federal jurisdiction.'"Although urged to distinguish Monroe and Moor on their
facts, and limit their holdings to actions for monetary damages,
the Ninth Circuit in Aldinger held that any contention that the
scope of suable defendants under section 1983 might vary according to the relief sought was eliminated by City of Kenosha v.
Bruno.'0 In Bruno, a section 1983 action for injunctive relief
against a municipal corporation was dismissed upon a finding that
the legislative history of section 1983 was devoid of any evidence
of intent to give the act a bifurcated interpretation."
Monroe with Justice Douglas' dissents in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507, 517 (1973) and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 72225 (1973).
27. See generally CONG.
(1871).

GLOBE,

42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317-832, app. 335

28. "The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by
the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used to include them." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 191 (1961).
29. 411 U.S. 693, 700.

ations:

(1) "[§]

The decision in Moor rests on several consider-

1988 instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in

causes of actions arising under federal civil rights acts. But we do not
believe that the section, without more, was meant to authorize the wholesale importation into federal law of state causes of action-not even one
purportedly designed for protection of federal civil rights." Id. at 703.
(2) "[Tlhe statute expressly limits the authority granted federal
courts to look to the common law, as modified by state law, to instances
in which that law 'is not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws
of the United States.' " Id. at 706.
(3) "[§] 1983 is unavailable to these petitioners insofar as they seek
to sue the County. And § 1988, in light of the express limitation contained within it, cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly re-

fused to do in enacting § 1983." Id. at 710.
The first consideration above seems less tenable than the second and
third in light of two court of appeals decisions which upheld the applica-

tion of state survivorship statutes to actions under § 1983 based upon
their reading of § 1988. See Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1961); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961). Moor acknowledged the two cases but failed to adequately distinguish them from the
application of a state cause of action for vicarious liability of municipalities with which it was confronted. 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14. See
Kates and Kouba, supra note 16, at 131, 156-57.

30. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
31. Id. at 513. In Bruno, the Court returned to its analysis of the
legislative history of § 1983: "We find nothing in the legislative history
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As to Aldinger's contention that the district court should
exercise pendent party jurisdiction over the county, the Ninth
Circuit applied its earlier decision in Hymer v. Chai.32 The
Hymer decision refused to extend pendent jurisdiction to the
claims of a party over whom no independent basis of federal
jurisdiction existed concluding that "[j]oinder of claims, not
'33
joinder of parties, is the object of the doctrine.
The decisions in Hymer and in Aldinger ran against the vast
majority of decisions in other circuits. Jurisdiction of pendent
party claims in federal question cases had been exercised without
regard to citizenship or amount in controversy by the First,
Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.3 4 Likewise the Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits had applied pendent
party jurisdiction in diversity cases where, as in Hymer, a claim
involving an additional party failed to meet the jurisdictional
amount.' 5- Only the Seventh Circuit had agreed with the Ninth
in refusing to exercise pendent party jurisdiction under any circumstances. :"' In Moor, the Court took judicial notice of the disagreement among the courts of appeals but chose to avoid the
issue.37 In Aldinger, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the
discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress to
suggest that the generic word 'person' in § 1983 was intended to have
a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." Id.
32. 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969). Hymer involved a notably different
factual situation from that in Aldinger. Hymer, a diversity action for
personal injuries, held that a plaintiff's wife could not join her claim
for loss of consortium with her husband's claims without meeting the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount.
33. Id. at 137. Accord, Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting pendent party jurisdiction over state tort claims against a
county when joined in a § 1983 action against a deputy sheriff); Kataoka
v. May Department Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940) (rejecting
an attempt to join the claim of a plaintiff whose presence would.destroy
diversity of citizenship).
34. Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Florida
E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1193-96 (5th Cir. 1975);
Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 519-20 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1974); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th
Cir. 1973); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972).
35. Niebur v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618, 621 (10th
Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 (3rd Cir. 1971); F. C. Stiles
Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970);
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1969);
Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000
(1974).
36. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Drennan v: City of Lake Forest, 356
F. Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
37. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973). The Court
upheld dismissal of the county on discretionary grounds without reaching
the issue of whether it had the power to hear the pendent party claims
against the county.
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conflict among the circuits. ' 8
THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Delivering the opinion of the majority, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
proposed at the outset to resolve the previously unanswered
question of "whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction extends to confer jurisdiction over a party as to whom no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists.

'39

Since the appel-

late courts have generally relied on United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs to justify the extension of pendent jurisdiction to the
pendent party situation, Mr. Justice Rehnquist focused on the
historical precedent for that case.4 0
The Synthesis of Pendent Jurisdiction
In 1824, Osborn v. Bank of the United States41 presented the
Court with the issue of whether a federal court could exercise
federal question jurisdiction over a controversy which also involved issues of state law. Chief Justice Marshall found that,
as a practical matter, if a court of original jurisdiction did not
have such power it could not function. Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co.4 2 expanded Osborn to include the power to
resolve a case presenting both issues of state and federal law
on purely state grounds, even without reaching the federal questions. In 1926, Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange,43 reflecting the
38. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. Id. at 2-3.
40. The Aldinger Court discussed the historical evolution of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 6-13. For additional authorities see

notes 4 &5 supra.
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Osborn, although noting that the
scope of Supreme Court review of a state court decision was properly

limited to issues of federal law, upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction, based on a statute authorizing the Bank of the United States to sue
in federal court, over a dispute involving matters of "general" law in
the determination of the legality of a state-imposed tax on the federal
bank:
[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction
of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823.
42. 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909). Siler involved a state statute establishing a railroad commission and regulating railroad rates which was challeged as being violative of both federal and state law. The Siter Court
ruled on the state claim without deciding the federal question.
43. 270 U.S. 593, 608-10 (1926). Moore relied on Binderup v. Pathe
Exch., 263 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1923) for its distinction between dismissal
on the merits and dismissal for want of jurisdiction:
A complaint setting forth a substantial claim under a federal statute

presents a case within the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court
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Siler rationale, sustained jurisdiction over a state based counterclaim which arose out of the same "transaction" as the plaintiff's
federal antitrust claim even though it had dismissed the federal
claim on the merits.
44
Drawing upon Osborn, Siler, and Moore, Hurn v. Oursler
extended the concept of pendent jurisdiction to allow joinder of
a plaintiff's state unfair competition claim with his federal copyright claim solely on the consideration of convenience to the parties.45 Hum proposed a rigid "single cause of action" test for
the application of pendent jurisdiction which required a distinction "between a case where two distinct grounds in support
of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal
in character. '46 The former was held to be a proper situation
for an exercise of pendent jurisdiction and the latter not.
The Court reexamined Hum in Gibbs and rejected the
''single cause of action" test as "unnecessarily grudging" in light
of the more flexible "case . . . or controversy" requirement of
and this jurisdiction cannot be made to stand or fall upon the way
the court may chance to decide an issue as to the legal sufficiency
of the facts alleged any more than upon the way it may decide as
to the legal sufficiency of the facts proven. Its decision either way
upon either question is predicated upon the existence of jurisdiction,
and not upon the absence of it. Jurisdiction as distinguished from
merits, is wanting only where the claim set forth in the complaint
is so unsubstantial as to be frivolous or, in other words, is plainly
without color of merit.
Moore's "same transaction" test was derived from former Equity
Rule 30, Fed. Equity R. of 1972, (now embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (a)
(1)) which provided in relevant part: "[t]he answer must state in short
and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which
is the subject-matter of the suit . . . so as to enable the court to pro-

nounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original and the
cross claims."
44. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Hurn extended the holding in Moore v. N.Y.
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926) to joinder of a federal and a
state claim brought by a single plaintiff, although Moore was factually
different in that it dealt with joinder of plaintiff's federal claim with
defendant's compulsory state counterclaim: "We think the question there
[in Moore] and the one here, in principle, cannot be distinguished. That
a statement of the particular counterclaim there was required by the rule
is not material, since the federal jurisdiction can neither be extended nor
abridged by a rule of court." 289 U.S. at 242.
45. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966);
WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 19 at 73.
46. 289 U.S. at 246. The Hum test was formulated before the merger
of law and equity in the Federal Rules. Its unwieldy application is best
illustrated by the Hum Court's application of the test to the facts. The
Court upheld jurisdiction over the state claim of unfair competition with
regard to the copyrighted version of the play because it was found to
be a separate ground for patent infringement. However, the Hurn Court
declined to extend federal jurisdiction over the state claim of unfair competition for the uncopyrighted versions of the play since it was found
to involve a separate cause of action.
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article III,4 7 which, the Court found, is broad enough to encompass both federal and nonfederal claims arising from the same
"common nucleus of operative fact."4' 8 Yet, although Gibbs
adopted a more flexible standard for pendent jurisdiction, factually Gibbs and its predecessors dealt only with joinder of nonfederal claims brought by parties already before the court asserting valid federal claims. Unlike Aldinger, none of the foregoing
cases dealt with the separate issue of joinder of parties over
whom no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists. However, paralleling the growth of pendent jurisdiction, a historically
distinct line of cases dealing with joinder of parties developed
under the name of ancillary jurisdiction.
The Synthesis of Ancillary Jurisdiction
The inception of ancillary jurisdiction has been traced to
Freeman v. Howe. 9 In 1860, Freeman held that parties claiming
property which had come under the control of a federal court
could litigate their claims in a federal forum regardless of
citizenship. This followed from the Freeman Court's initial determination that state court interference with property already
under the federal court's control must be prohibited to protect
the district court's jurisdiction and was necessary to provide all
claimants with a forum in which to press their claims. '0 The
claims of parties lacking diversity of citizenship were :mtertained
"ancillary" to the federal court action which had taken control
of the property.
Stewart v. Dunham' utilized a rationale similar to that in
Freeman. In Stewart, the Court held that once a diversity action
had been properly removed to a district court, the subsequent
addition of new parties as co-complainants could not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction over the matter even though their addition at the outset would have destroyed diversity jurisdiction.
47. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966).

The

Gibbs Court focused on the practical overlay of facts which would be

necessary to meet the article III "case" requirement while the Hurn

Court clung to traditionally obscure definitions of what constitutes a
cause of action.
48. Id. at 725.
49. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). Freeman was a diversity action
in which the United States marshall seized certain railroad cars by at-

tachment. Mortgagees of the railroad commenced an action in state
court. The Supreme Court held, however, that a state court could not
interfere with the federal court's disposition of the property already
under its control.
50. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 19, at 21-22. Cf., Supreme Tribe of BenHur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (holding that a federal court has

jurisdiction to do those acts necessary to effectuate and protect its judgment from relitigation in a state court).
51. 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
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In Fulton National Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier,5 2 the Court
established the general rule that only after federal jurisdiction
had been exercised over an action or property could a federal
court entertain ancillary claims by intervention. Yet one year
later, Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange5" expanded the concept
to reach beyond intervening claims to property to include
the power to hear a defendant's nonfederal counterclaim after
dismissing the plaintiff's federal claim even where the nonfederal
counterclaim did not involve property within the federal court's
control. Moore, shifted the rationale underlying the ancillary
jurisdiction cases from that of the necessity of providing all
claimants with their day in court to considerations of convenience and the avoidance of multiple suits arising from the same
"transaction."

54

Merger of the Doctrines of Pendent
and Ancillary Jurisdiction
On certiorari, Aldinger argued that the development of the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction evidenced an
erosion of historical distinctions with the two doctrines becoming
conceptually indistinguishable. One factor bearing on Aldinger's
assertion is the move from necessity to convenience as the underlying rationale for both doctrines. Since Moore dealt with
joinder of different parties' claims it has been considered an ancillary jurisdiction case. However, the Moore case presented no
"principled" difference to the Hum Court from the joinder of
a plaintiff's federal and nonfederal claims against a single defendant to avoid a multiplicity of actions. 5 Also, the development of the "common nucleus of operative fact" test in Gibbs
more closely resembles the same "transaction" test in Moore than
the obtuse "single cause of action" test in Hum. Lastly, the
Gibbs Court's reference to the liberal policies of joinder of both
claims and parties in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that the underlying concerns in each situation are the same
-namely convenience and efficiency. Thus Aldinger proposed
that, because her state claim against the county arose from the
52. 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925). Hozier was a bankruptcy proceeding
in which a plaintiff intervened seeking to reach assets of the bankruptcy

creditor which had been deposited in a bank before bankruptcy proceed-

ings ensued. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims
against the third party bank and, since the assets in question had not

come within the federal court's control, ancillary jurisdiction was not
available over the claims against the third party bank.

53. 270 U.S. 593 (1926)

(this same case is discussed in terms of its

effect on the development of pendent jurisdiction in notes 43 & 44 and
accompanying text supra).
54. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 19, at 22-23.

55. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. at 242. See note 44 supra.
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same "common nucleus of operative fact" as her federal claims
against individual defendants, it satisfied the Gibbs test for
pendent claim jurisdiction, and because the Federal Rules and
ancillary jurisdiction provide for liberal joinder of parties, the
district court had the power to hear her whole case. 56
The Aldinger majority, although recognizing Moore as the
"decisional bridge" between the doctrines,5 7 declined "to formulate any general, all-encompassing jurisdictional rule."5 " Avoiding the issue initially addressed, the Court instead distinguished
the holding in Gibbs.
The Aldinger Court's Reconsiderationof Gibbs
The Aldinger majority differentiated Gibbs from the case at
hand on both factual and legal grounds. The factual difference
noted was that in Gibbs the defendant was already in federal
court on a substantial federal claim when forced to answer the
plaintiff's state claim, whereas in Aldinger the plaintiff sought
to force a defendant into federal court who would not otherwise
be there. 59 Acknowledging that considerations of convenience
and efficiency apply to both situations, the Aldinger majority
stressed that Aldinger was not precluded from bringing her
whole action in state court, concluding that where convenience
and efficiency are available at the state level such considerations
carry less weight at the federal level.6'1
The legal difference noted between Aldinger and Gibbs lies
in the different statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction
invoked in each case. Aldinger, the majority stated, posed an
issue not presented in Gibbs or its predecessors: whether the
statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction which supports the
petitioner's federal claim is indicative of congressional intent to
limit the federal court's power over appended nonfederal claims
involving new parties."' Although faced with congressional
silence on the scope of action conferred by section 1331, the juris56. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1976).

Accord, Comment,

Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of the Two
Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1975).

57. 427 U.S. at 12.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 14.

60. Id. at 15-16. Considerations such as efficiency and convenience

are not the only considerations relevant to the presence or absence of
jurisdiction, especially in light of the well established principle that the
federal courts are courts of limited, as opposed to general, jurisdiction.
See Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir.
1972).
61. 427 U.S. at 16. "(W]hether by virtue of the grant of subject-

matter jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal claim ... rests,
Congress has addressed itself to the party as to whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim is sought." Id.
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dictional statute in Gibbs, the majority found evidence of congressional intent to limit the scope of action brought under section 1343 (3), the jurisdictional statute in Aldinger. This deduction was arrived at by reading section 1343, which authorizes
original jurisdiction over "any civil action authorized by law,"
in light of the narrowly construed cause of action conferred by
section 1983 against natural "persons.162 The majority reasoned
that, since Congress had expressly excluded counties from liability under section 1983, and, implicitly, from the grant of jurisdiction in section 1343, the scope of a "civil action" over which
section 1343 confers original jurisdiction should not be so broadly
read as to bring the county back into federal court under the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction."
The holding in Aldinger was expressly limited to avoid any
"sweeping pronouncements" upon the existence of pendent party
jurisdiction in other factual contexts. The rule only extends to
assertions of pendent party jurisdiction over a municipal corporation when joined with section 1983 claims against a municipal
officer where any independent basis of federal jurisdiction over
the claims involving the municipal corporation, such as diversity
of citizenship, is lacking. 64 As a general guideline, though, the
Court suggested that the following test be applied to all other
pendent party situations: first, a federal court must look to the
statutory grants of federal jurisdiction for express or implied
congressional intent to limit such jurisdiction; second, a court
should turn to the general contours of article III to determine
whether the entire action may be viewed as a single constitutional "case."65
The Dissent
The Aldinger minority attacked the decision on several
62. Id. at 16-17. "[A] s against a plaintiff's claim of additional power
over a 'pendent party,' the reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction
should be construed in light of the scope of the cause of action as to
which federal judicial power has been extended by Congress." Id. at
17.
63. Id. at 17. The Court's reluctance to allow indirectly that which
is directly prohibited was consistent with the earlier decisions which followed Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973); and discussion in notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
64. 427 U.S. at 17 n.12.
All that we hold is that where the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction over a municipal corporation is not diversity of citizenship, but
is a claim of jurisdiction pendent to a suit brought against a municipal officer within § 1343, the refusal of Congress to authorize suits
against municipal corporations under the cognate provisions of § 1983
is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of pendent party jurisdiction.
Id.
65. Id. at 17-18.
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grounds. "6 Primarily, the dissent disagreed with the factual and
legal distinctions drawn by the majority between Aldinger and
Gibbs. Factually, the dissent argued that, since article III deals
with subject matter jurisdiction, not in personam jurisdiction, the
same principles applied by the Gibbs Court to pendent state
claims should apply in Aldinger regardless of whether joinder
of the state claim involves additional parties. 7 The majority's
statutory distinctions were considered equally untenable since
neither section 1331 nor section 1343 is, on its face, addressed
to the propriety of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction!8
The dissent criticized the majority's jurisdictional test as
being capable, at one level, of invalidating every exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction which, by definition, will "involve a
party as to whom Congress has impliedly 'addressed itself' by
not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts." 69 The majority's application of the test to the facts
drew the harshest criticism. Although agreeing with the majority's conclusion that the legislative history of section 1983 indicates a clear intent not to impose federal liability upon political
subdivisions of the states, the dissent argued that such a conclusion in no way indicates a concomitant aversion to state imposed liability such as Aldinger sought to invoke."'
ANALYSIS

The majority opinion in Aldinger relies on a number of
tenuous assumptions and distinctions. The opinion's shortcom66. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr.

Justice Blackmun, dissented. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr.

Justice Brennan, who, coincidentally, authored the majority opinion in
Gibbs.

67. Gibbs concerned a state-law claim jurisdictionally pendent to one

of federal law, but no reason appears why the identical principles
should not equally apply to pendent state law claims involving the
joinder of additional parties. In either case the Art. III question concerns only the subject matter and not the in personam jurisdiction
of the federal courts. In either case the question of Art. III power
in the federal judiciary to exercise subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether the claims asserted are such as "would ordinarily be
expected to [be tried] in one judicial proceeding," and the question
of discretion addresses "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."
427 U.S. at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
68. The purely jurisdictional statute involved in this case, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343 (3), in no way speaks to the issue of pendent party jurisdiction
in respect to joinder of defendants under pendent state law claims.
On its face that statute speaks only to jurisdiction over civil actions
"authorized by law to be commenced by any person," and plainly
does not address the question of what parties shall be joined as defendants.
427 U.S. at 23-24.
69. Id. at 22-23.
70. Id. at 24.
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ings may be explained, in part, by the majority's conscious effort
to avoid establishing any general jurisdictional rule. However,
the opinion leaves several crucial issues unresolved rendering the
underlying constitutional rationale of questionable validity.
As emphasized by the dissent, the weakest assumption relied
on by the majority is that the legislative history of section 1983
dictated the outcome in Aldinger. Although the opinion did not
discuss the legislative history of section 1983, by citing Moor and
Bruno for the proposition that a county is not a suable "person"
within section 1983, the majority indicated that the earlier judicial interpretation of the act applied."' Just as the Ninth Circuit
had done, the majority generalized that, after Monroe, section
1983 actions could not be maintained against municipal corporations for any purpose.72 Yet Monroe, Moor, and Bruno only
dealt with the scope of the federal cause of action created by
section 1983; none of them confronted the separate issue of a
federal court's power to hear pendent party claims.
The original section 1983, entitled "An act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment .

.

,"

was ratified during

the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War.7" The purpose
of the act was primarily to provide a federally enforcible remedy
against acts of terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan, because the states
had shown an unwillingness and inability to provide adequate
protection on their own.14 The original bill which was passed
by the House was comparable to its present day form, however,
the Senate tacked on what is known as the Sherman Amendment. 75 The Sherman Amendment was notably broader than
the original provisions, proposing to impose liability on any
"county, city, and parish" where citizens suffered violations of
their constitutional rights.7 6 The House's eventual rejection of
71. Id. at 16. For strong argument that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S
167 (1961) should have been distinguished on its facts see Kates and
Kouba, supra note 16, at 147-56.
72. 427 U.S. at 16.
73. Act of April 20, 1871, 17 REV. STAT. 13, ch. 22 § 1.
74. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 251-52 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.' dissenting).
75. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 & 749 (1871).
76. The Sherman Amendment appeared in two forms. The first
version provided that if certain enumerated offenses against property or
persons were committed to deprive any person of rights conferred by
the Constitution and laws of the United States that:
[I]n every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish
in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable
to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such
offense .... And execution may be issued on a judgment rendered
in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal,
or any person in said county, city, or parish, and the said county,
city, or, parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, costs
and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principle or ac-
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the Sherman Amendment has consistently been cited as evidence
that Congress did not intend to impose liability under section
1983 upon the political subdivisions of the states. 77 It is clear
from a reading of the legislative history that congressional rejection of the Sherman Amendment was based on two central
concerns: (1) underlying doubts as to the constitutionality of
such an act;7 8 and (2) the undesirable prospect of imposing
liability on local governmental units regardless of fault or the
ability to prevent the unlawful activity.79 Yet, Congress in no
way intended to restrict liability which the states themselves imposed.80 It does not follow that the same motivations behind congressional rejection of federally imposed liability apply with
equal force to negate a federal court's jurisdiction to hear claims
based on state imposed liability. Indeed, the majority did not
say that diversity jurisdiction would be unavailable to support
a state claim against a county when joined with a section 1983
claim against an individual."'
The majority assumed that the narrow scope of section 1983
cessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdic-

tion.
CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871) (emphasis added).
In response to harsh criticism from the House, a second version was
drafted which lessened governmental liability:
And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may if not satisfied by the
individual defendant . . . be enforced against such county, city or

parish....

And such county, city or parish, so paying, shall also

be subrogated to all plaintiff's rights under such judgment.
Id. at 749.

77. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512 (1973); Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 172-74 (1961).
The Supreme Court's use of the legislative history of § 1983 has been
criticized by a number of commentators. See Kates and Kouba, supra
note 16, at 132-34; McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations
on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1, 5-36 (1974); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for
Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922, 945-51 (1976); [hereinafter cited as Remedies]; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the
Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAnv. L. REV. 1486, 1488-89 (1969); Developing, supra note 26, at 1205-07; 45 UMKC L. REV. 29, 47-52 (1976); 8 VAL.
L. REV. 215, 229-34 (1974).
The holdings of Monroe, Moor, and Bruno may not retain their valid-

ity for long. In response to these and several other Supreme Court decisions narrowing the scope of actions under § 1983, Senators Edward W.
Brooke and Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. and Congressman Parren J.
Mitchell have introduced a bill entitled "The Civil Rights Improvements
Act
of 1977" which would provide, among other things,
the term
"person" in § 1983 would include "any individual, State, that
municipality,
or any agency or unit of government of such State or municipality." S.
35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). H.R. 4514, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
78. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 708 (1973).
79. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1973) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J. dissenting in part).
80. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 25-30 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
81. Id. at 17 n.12. See note 64 supra.
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should control the scope of jurisdiction conferred by section
1343.82 The only explanation offered in support was that section
1983 is one of the "civil actions authorized by law" over which
original jurisdiction is conferred by section 1343.11 Since the decision hinged on this interrelationship between a federal cause
of action and a federal jurisdictional statute, it is puzzling that
no further rationale was offered. Although section 1343 confers
federal jurisdiction over section 1983 actions, that jurisdictional
grant is not limited to section 1983 actions.8 4 Since section 1983
creates a federal cause of action for civil rights grievances and
does not restrict the right of the states to create their own causes
of action it is not clear that section 1983 limitations should control the broad jurisdictional grant of section 1343 which gives
the federal courts the power to hear "any civil action authorized
by law."
Another unexplained assumption relied on by the majority
is that joinder of parties requires stricter statutory scrutiny than
joinder of claims. In distinguishing Gibbs and its predecessors
the majority concluded that:
[n]one of them posed the need for a further inquiry into the
underlying statutory grant of federal jurisdiction insofar as a
flexible analysis of concepts such as "question," "claim," and
"cause of action," because Congress had not addressed itself by
statute to this matter. In short, Congress had said nothing about
the scope of the word "Cases" in Art. III which would offer
guidance on the kind of elusive question addressed in Osborn
and Gibbs: whether and to what extent jurisdiction extended

to a parallel state claim against the existing federal defendant.8 5
If, in the jurisdictional statute considered in Gibbs, Congress
had said nothing to offer guidance as to whether the scope of
a constitutional "case" is broad enough to encompass pendent
claims, it is equally arguable that Congress has been silent as
to the existence of pendent party jurisdiction as presented in Aldinger.86 Sections 1343 and 1983, when read together, do not in82. 427 U.S. at 23-24. Mr. Justice Brennan made the same assump-

tion in his concurring opinion in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507,
516 (1973). For a discussion of the historical relationship of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 see 8 VAL. L. REV. 215, 229-34 (1974) (arguing that § 1343 confers jurisdiction on federal courts for direct actions
under the Constitution and is not limited in scope to actions under §
1983). See also 45 UMKC L. REV. 29, 52-54 (1976).
83. 427 U.S. at 16-17.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
85. 427 U.S. at 13-14.
86. The argument has been made that implicit in the holding of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), is the notion that

Congress has in fact conferred upon the federal courts the whole range

of article III power by granting original jurisdiction over all "civil actions" in § 1331, the federal question statute. One thing is certain-Congress has not expressly disapproved the holding in Gibbs. See Note,
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dicate a congressional attitude toward pendent party jurisdiction
any more than section 1331, the federal jurisdictional statute in
Gibbs, indicates a congressional attitude toward pendent claim
jurisdiction. Although sections 1343 and 1983 do not expressly
confer federal jurisdiction over parties such as Spokane County,
neither does section 1331 expressly confer federal jurisdiction
over claims arising under state law. Thus the statutory distinctions relied upon by the majority are not discernible and
lend little support to its conclusion.
Equally unclear is the significance of the Aldinger majority's
factual distinction between Gibbs and Aldinger. The majority
stressed that Aldinger, unlike Gibbs, presented an inconvenience
7
to a defendant who would not otherwise be in federal court.,
However, the majority overlooked the underlying purpose behind
section 1983-to provide plaintiffs with a federal forum for civil
rights grievances 88 Although pendent party jurisdiction would
force a defendant into federal court, the refusal to exercise pendent party jurisdiction may, as a practical matter, force plaintiffs
with civil rights grievances into state court in order to achieve
the convenience and efficiency of suing both individual and corporate defendants in one action. Since Gibbs was justified, in
part, by concerns of federalism arising from the defendant's contention that the state law claims against him had been preempted
by federal law, 8 9 it is arguable that similar concerns inhere in
Aldinger because it is in the interests of federalism to provide
unimpeded access to the federal courts for civil rights grievances.
The refusal to allow Aldinger to sue both defendants in one
federal action runs against another underlying concern in Gibbs.
The Gibbs test required that a plaintiff's claims be so related
that "if considered without regard for their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding ....
Reflecting the rationale for res judicata and collateral estoppel,
the Gibbs doctrine was aimed at the promotion of judicial economy and fairness to the parties. 9 ' The decision in Aldinger does
not reflect those same concerns. Since recent decisions have reFederal Pendent Party Jurisdictionand United Mine Workers v. GibbsFederal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 194, 197, 202-03 nn.
47 & 49 (1976).

87. 427 U.S. at 14.
88. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
89. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966). "IT]he
question whether the permissible scope of the state claim was limited

by the doctrine of pre-emption afforded a special reason for the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction; the federal courts are particularly appropriate

bodies for the application of pre-emption principles."
90. Id. at 725.
91. Id. at 723.
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jected the mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel, 92 a litigant pressing section 1983 claims in federal court may face a
serious disadvantage when proceeding against a corporate defendant on a vicarious liability theory in state court. If the
plaintiff wins in federal court, he will of course be forced to
prove the same issues in state court; but if the plaintiff loses in
his federal action, the state defendant may be able to raise collateral estoppel in the state action.
The majority did take notice that the elements of efficiency,
convenience and fairness to the parties were equally present in
Aldinger and Gibbs, yet the opinion indicates that when, as in
Aldinger, such factors are available in state courts having concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claims, they carry little
weight.", Conversely, where the federal claims fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, the majority indicates
that a stronger argument can be made for joinder of pendent
party claims."4 However, as the dissent implies, such a distinction appears more relevant to the discretion of the court than
to the power to entertain pendent party actions."5
CONCLUSION

The Aldinger decision does not rest firmly upon the grounds
set forth by the majority. The majority's insistence that judicial
expansions of federal jurisdiction must yield to the will of Congress follows logically from a reading of article III. Yet the majority has failed to adequately explain why pendent party jurisdiction is less justifiable than pendent claim jurisdiction.
Perhaps the best explanation for the holding in Aldinger is
that it fits into a decisional trend toward limiting access to the
federal courts."6 The Burger Court has consistently restricted
federal jurisdiction in recent decisions on standing," jurisdictional amounts in class actions, 8 and the scope of federal habeas
92. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971).
93. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id. at 35-37.
96. See Askin, Limiting Access to Federal Courts, 33 GUILD PRAC. 130
(1976); Goldberg and Schwartz, Narrowing Access to Justice, 5 STUDENT
LAW. 34 (1977); Note, Zahn - The Freeze on Federal Jurisdiction, 1975
WASH. U. L. Q. 447.
97. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974).
98. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that ancillary

jurisdiction was not available to support the claims of members of a
class in a class action who did not individually claim in excess of $10,000).
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corpus review." As stated at the outset, the federal caseload
has grown rapidly in recent years, especially in the civil rights
field. In response, the Burger Court has made the federal courts
inaccessible to civil rights litigants suing public corporations
under section 1983, and unattractive to litigants with claims
against both individuals and public corporations. Ironically, Aldinger is not likely to effect any real reduction in the caseload
because litigants have discovered a new means for bringing public corporations into federal court for constitutional violationssuing directly under the Constitution. 10 0
The direct effect of Aldinger upon the development of
pendent party jurisdiction is bound to be minimal. 10 1 The
Court's avoidance of the issue of pendent party power leaves the
99. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
100. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(sustaining a direct action for damages under the fourth amendment
against federal officers); Stepp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d
527 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging Aldinger while sustaining a direct action under the Constitution against a school board); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that even though the
defendant was not a "person" under § 1983 that allegations of fourteenth
amendment violations causing damages in excess of $10,000 were sufficient to meet § 1331 jurisdictional requirements); Sixth Camden Corp.
v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976) (sustaining
a direct action against a municipality under the fourteenth amendment
and § 1331 when joined with a § 1983 action against individuals). See
also Remedies, supra note 77, at 952-60; 36 MD. L. REV. 123, 127-52 (1976).
Contra, Livingood v. Townsend, 422 F. Supp. 24 (D. Minn. 1976) (refusing to allow a direct action against a municipality due to Aldinger). But
cf. McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming the dismissal of a direct action against a county on eleventh amendment
grounds).
101. The following cases have cited Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1
(1976), for a variety of reasons: Stepp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd.,
545 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding direct action under the Constitution against a school board while acknowledging that Aldinger had precluded a § 1983 action against the board); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,
Inc., 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Aldinger as latest discussion of
Gibbs, in exercising discretionary dismissal of a state claim joined with
a federal claim which had been dismissed for lack of standing); Livingood
v. Townsend, 422 F. Supp. 24 (D. Minn. 1976) (refusing to apply a § 1331
direct action under the Constitution against a municipality due to the
Aldinger decision); Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 421 F.
Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1976) (applying Aldinger in the context of a Gibbs
joinder of claims situation); Hupart v. Board of Higher Ed., 420 F. Supp.
1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dismissing state claims against the school board
brought pendent to civil rights claims against individuals); Sixth Camden
Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976) (upholding
a direct action under the Constitution and § 1331 against a municipality);
Haber v. County of Nassau, 418 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (dismissing
pendent state claims against the county); Rende v. Rizzo, 418 F. Supp.
96 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dismissed with leave to amend complaint for lack
of specificity in action joining claims under § 1983 and direct action
under Constitution against individual defendants); Regan v. Sullivan, 417
F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (dismissing pendent state claims against
individual defendants after ruling that federal claims under § 1983 and
the Constitution were barred by statute of limitations); Vargas v. Correa,
416 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (upheld pendent state claim against
a municipality when joined with a § 1983 claim against prison guard.
This case was decided after the circuit court decision in Aldinger but
before the Supreme Court decision).
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lower courts free to apply the doctrine in contexts other than
section 1983 actions. However, several inferences may be drawn
from the opinion. First, the Court has evidenced a reluctance
to deny the existence of pendent party jurisdiction, although indicating that pendent party jurisdiction faces greater obstacles
than pendent claim jurisdiction. 102 Second, the Court has indicated that special attention must be given to the relevant federal
statutes. 10 : Lastly, considerations of efficiency and fairness will
be weighed according to the availability of an alternative forum
for all claims.' 04 Without a more definitive statement on the
subject, one thing is certain: the conflict among the circuits is
sure to continue.
Wallace J. Wolff

102. 427 U.S. at 18.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15.

